Estrategias de negociación del FMI y la Argentina durante el período 2003- 2004
Cargando...
Archivos
Fecha
Authors
Título de la revista
ISSN de la revista
Título del volumen
Editor
UNR Editora
Resumen
[es] El presente trabajo busca realizar un aporte en
sentido tanto teórico como empírico, a la temática de la relación entre el FMI y Gobiernos
prestatarios. En términos teóricos, desarrolla un
esquema conceptual de doble nivel para sistematizar el estudio de procesos de negociación
entre los actores citados. El análisis se centra en
las estrategias que implementan los negociadores, las cuales, a su vez, están en relación con la
posición negociadora y el estilo de negociación.
En términos empíricos, presenta un análisis de
las negociaciones entre el FMI y el Gobierno argentino durante el período 2003-2004 en base al
esquema planteado. Se proponen dos hipótesis.
Primero, si bien tanto el Gobierno como el FMI
desplegaron estrategias confrontativas, el primero consiguió imponer su criterio en la mayoría
de los temas conflictivos porque articuló una posición negociadora de mayor fortaleza. Segunda,
el Gobierno desplegó en la tercera revisión una
estrategia confrontativa para evitar cumplir
compromisos que abrían un conflicto con su
base de apoyo local, pero el Fondo profundizó
su negativa a tolerar incumplimientos. Esto estancó la negociación y determinó la suspensión
del acuerdo
[en] This paper seeks to contribute in both theoretical and empirical sense, to the theme of the relationship between the IMF and borrowing governments. In theoretical terms, develops a two-level conceptual framework for systematizing the study of negotiation processes between the mentioned actors. The analysis focuses on the strategies implemented by the negotiators, which, in turn, are related to its bargaining position and negotiating style. Empirically, presents an analysis of the negotiations between the IMF and the Argentine government during the 2003-2004 period based on the scheme aforementioned. Two hypothesis are proposed. First, although both the government and the IMF deployed confrontational strategies, the former succeeded in imposing its criteria on the most contentious issues because rested on a stronger bargaining position. Second, the government deployed in the third review a confrontational strategy to avoid fulfilling commitments which will raise a conflict with its local support base, but the Fund stepped up its refusal to tolerate non-compliances. This stalled the negotiation and determined the suspension of the agreement.
[en] This paper seeks to contribute in both theoretical and empirical sense, to the theme of the relationship between the IMF and borrowing governments. In theoretical terms, develops a two-level conceptual framework for systematizing the study of negotiation processes between the mentioned actors. The analysis focuses on the strategies implemented by the negotiators, which, in turn, are related to its bargaining position and negotiating style. Empirically, presents an analysis of the negotiations between the IMF and the Argentine government during the 2003-2004 period based on the scheme aforementioned. Two hypothesis are proposed. First, although both the government and the IMF deployed confrontational strategies, the former succeeded in imposing its criteria on the most contentious issues because rested on a stronger bargaining position. Second, the government deployed in the third review a confrontational strategy to avoid fulfilling commitments which will raise a conflict with its local support base, but the Fund stepped up its refusal to tolerate non-compliances. This stalled the negotiation and determined the suspension of the agreement.