Proaíresis, Freedom and Liberation in the Dissertations of Epictetus
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Universidad del Zulia
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El objetivo de las presentes páginas consiste en analizar el concepto de libertad en las Disertaciones de Epicteto, centrándonos sobre la posibilidad de la libertad y su articulación con el concepto de proaíresis. Demostraremos que la libertad no puede ser comprendida en la obra de Epicteto simplemente como un proceso negativo de liberación respecto de determinaciones (externas e internas), sino que exige un momento complementario de sustitución de las determinaciones erróneas por determinaciones racionales/virtuosas. Tal conclusión exigirá precisar que la proaíresis no es en absoluto una facultad naturalmente indeterminada y libre, sino que su libertad opera como un horizonte regulativo al que sólo se puede acceder mediante el correcto cuidado (epiméleia) del alma.
The aim of the present paper will be to analyse the concept of freedom within Epictetus' Dissertations, focusing on the possibility of freedom and its articulation to the concept of proaíresis. We shall prove that freedom cannot be understood within Epictetus' work merely as a negative process of liberation from (internal and external) determinations, but that it demands a complementary moment of substituting wrong determinations with rational/virtuous ones. Such a conclusion will require the clarification that the proairesis is in no way a naturally undetermined and free faculty of the soul, but that its freedom operates as a regulative horizon which can only be reached through the correct care (epiméleiá) of the soul
The aim of the present paper will be to analyse the concept of freedom within Epictetus' Dissertations, focusing on the possibility of freedom and its articulation to the concept of proaíresis. We shall prove that freedom cannot be understood within Epictetus' work merely as a negative process of liberation from (internal and external) determinations, but that it demands a complementary moment of substituting wrong determinations with rational/virtuous ones. Such a conclusion will require the clarification that the proairesis is in no way a naturally undetermined and free faculty of the soul, but that its freedom operates as a regulative horizon which can only be reached through the correct care (epiméleiá) of the soul
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