The Legacies of Judicial Instability in Latin America
Cargando...
Fecha
Título de la revista
ISSN de la revista
Título del volumen
Editor
SeIDeSoC
Resumen
Descripción
Students of institutions have
identified a pattern of ―serial
replacement,‖ distinctive of Latin
American countries in which
institutional change has become
frequent as well as radical. Patterns
of serial replacement underlie wellknown
―traps‖ of deinstitutionalization:
military coups
beget more coups, democratic
breakdowns make breakdowns more
likely, constitutional replacements
encourage the adoption of new
constitutions, inter-branch conflicts
feed further conflicts, and so on. In
this paper we develop a theory of
serial replacement and apply it to
explain cycles of judicial instability
in 18 Latin American countries.
Using a novel dataset covering more
than 3,000 Supreme Court and
Constitutional Tribunal justices
between 1900 and 2010, we show
that political attempts to reshuffle
Supreme Courts and Constitutional
Tribunals encourage new attempts
to reshuffle the high courts in later years, creating a sequential pattern
of judicial instability.
Palabras clave
Citación
Aprobación
Revisión
Complementado por
Referenciado por
Licencia Creative Commons
Excepto donde se indique lo contrario, la licencia de este ítem se describe como Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported (CC BY 3.0)