Since Bobzien’s analysis of the early Stoic concept of that which ‘depends on us’
(τὰ ἐφ̓ ἡμῖν) and of its later connection with the concept of freedom (ἐλευθερία),1
great progress has been made in the endeavour of producing a new reading of Stoic
ethics that can do away with the assumptions foreign to Hellenistic philosophy that
had so long pervaded the traditional interpretations of Stoicism. Notwithstanding
the persistent interest in early Stoic discussions of the problem of compatibilism,2
the analysis of Epictetus’ particular conception of freedom has frequently been
neglected: it has often been equated to his distinction between that which ‘depends
on us’ and that which does not, being interpreted as meaning that we are free in
our actions as long as we limit ourselves to that which depends on us and neglect
that which does not, that which has nothing to do with us. Initially, all the evidence
in both the Discourses and in the Enchiridion certainly seems to support such an
equation: for something to be free (ἐλεύθερος) it must necessarily be something
which depends on us. Nevertheless, little attention has been paid to the ‘us’ in the
last formula. I shall argue that only by analysing that precise element will we be
able to reach a complete understanding of Epictetus’ solution to the problem of
freedom and determinism and the rationalist educational programme he designs as
its natural projection. I will claim that there is no such thing as an abstract ‘us’
which could be instantiated by each and every rational being; on the contrary, I
propose to construe the reference of that term as a particularizing strategy that
denotes not only each distinct individual but also each distinct individual’s epistemic
disposition of his prohairesis at a given moment.