Moderación y ascetismo en Séneca, Musonio y Epicteto
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Universidad del Valle
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Las prácticas ascéticas propuestas por los estoicos romanos como vías de
acceso a la vida virtuosa parecen, a primera vista, establecer un conflicto
con la concepción intelectualista de la acción humana defendida por la
ortodoxia estoica. Dada la función pedagógica que asumen dichas prácticas
en el estoicismo romano, el interrogante acerca de su legitimidad doctrinal
se vuelve inevitable, en la medida en que parecen admitir la ineficacia
de la argumentación racional como vía de (auto) persuasión respecto
de la axiología estoica. El objetivo del artículo consistirá entonces en
analizar dichas prácticas ascéticas, a fin de demostrar que, a pesar del
origen pitagórico-cínico de las mismas, no sólo no contradicen la matriz
intelectualista de la psicología, sino que, por el contrario, representan
un dispositivo gnoseológico central para la dinámica de la comprensión
desarrollada durante ese período de la escuela.
The ascetic practices proposed by Roman Stoics as ways of access to a virtuous life seem, at first sight, to pose a serious problem concerning the intellectualist conception of human action defended by orthodox Stoicism. Considering the pedagogical function that these practices have in Roman Stoicism, the question about their validity from a doctrinal perspective becomes inevitable, given that they seem to imply the inefficacy of rational argumentation as a means of (self)persuasion concerning Stoic axiology. The goal of this paper we be to analyze those ascetical practices, in order to show not only that, despite their pythagorical-cynic origin, they do not contradict the Stoic intellectualist psychology, but also that they represent a gnoseological device that is central to the dynamic of the process of comprehension as it was developed during the Roman period of the school.
The ascetic practices proposed by Roman Stoics as ways of access to a virtuous life seem, at first sight, to pose a serious problem concerning the intellectualist conception of human action defended by orthodox Stoicism. Considering the pedagogical function that these practices have in Roman Stoicism, the question about their validity from a doctrinal perspective becomes inevitable, given that they seem to imply the inefficacy of rational argumentation as a means of (self)persuasion concerning Stoic axiology. The goal of this paper we be to analyze those ascetical practices, in order to show not only that, despite their pythagorical-cynic origin, they do not contradict the Stoic intellectualist psychology, but also that they represent a gnoseological device that is central to the dynamic of the process of comprehension as it was developed during the Roman period of the school.
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