Las leyes de la naturaleza como determinación matemática del movimiento en la física cartesiana
Fecha
2019
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Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
Resumen
Descripción
Descartes, en los Principios de la filosofía, afirma que las leyes de la naturaleza
que allí postula son causa segunda del movimiento de los cuerpos. Se trata de una
afirmación problemática y diferentes intentos se han hecho por dar una explicación
satisfactoria acerca del estrecho vínculo que esto supone entre las leyes de la naturaleza y
la noción de causa. En este trabajo defenderé la hipótesis de que dichas leyes son
determinaciones matemáticas a las que las partes, los modos, de la substancia extensa
responden por el solo hecho de ser la substancia material matemática, o más bien,
geométrica. Y es en este sentido, sostendré, hay que entenderlas como causas segundas.
Expondré brevemente el modo en el que el concepto moderno de causa comienza a
diferenciarse de la cuádruple causalidad aristotélica y de la de forma substancial
escolástica, luego brindaré algunos elementos generales sobre la noción cartesiana de
causa y que habré de considerar al presentar, a continuación, la hipótesis que sostengo.
Descartes, in his Principles of Philosophy, claims that the laws of nature there postulated are the secondary causes of the movement of the bodies. It is a problematic statement and different attempts have been made to provide a satisfactory explanation about the implicated close link between the laws of nature and the notion of cause. In this paper I will defend the hypothesis according to which these laws are mathematical determinations to which the parts, the modes, of the extended substance respond by the mere fact of being the material substance mathematical, or rather, geometrical. In this sense, I will sustain, we must understand that laws as secondary causes. First, I will briefly explain how the modern concept of cause begins to differentiate from the fourfold Aristotelian causation model and from the scholastic substantial form, then I will give some general elements about the Cartesian notion of cause that I will consider, next, when presenting the hypothesis that I sustain.
Descartes, in his Principles of Philosophy, claims that the laws of nature there postulated are the secondary causes of the movement of the bodies. It is a problematic statement and different attempts have been made to provide a satisfactory explanation about the implicated close link between the laws of nature and the notion of cause. In this paper I will defend the hypothesis according to which these laws are mathematical determinations to which the parts, the modes, of the extended substance respond by the mere fact of being the material substance mathematical, or rather, geometrical. In this sense, I will sustain, we must understand that laws as secondary causes. First, I will briefly explain how the modern concept of cause begins to differentiate from the fourfold Aristotelian causation model and from the scholastic substantial form, then I will give some general elements about the Cartesian notion of cause that I will consider, next, when presenting the hypothesis that I sustain.
Palabras clave
Descartes, Leyes de la naturaleza, Leyes del movimiento, Causas segundas, Laws of nature, Laws of movement, Secondary causes