Excepcionalidad jurídica y contrainsurgencia: claves para pensar la racionalidad militar en los inicios del terror de Estado en Argentina (1973-1976)
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2017
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Universidad Nacional de Rosario. Facultad de Humanidades y Artes. Escuela de Historia.
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Descripción
Este artículo analiza dos factores centrales de las condiciones de posibilidad del terror de Estado ejecutado por las Fuerzas Armadas argentinas durante la década del setenta: la construcción de un estado de excepción y el desarrollo de una doctrina de “guerra antisubversiva”. En primer lugar, se explora la situación de excepcionalidad jurídica creada por el Estado nacional mediante una serie de leyes y decretos de defensa y seguridad interna desde la década del sesenta hasta 1975. En segundo lugar, se estudia la doctrina de la “guerra antisubversiva” desarrollada por el Ejército, la principal arma encargada de la represión clandestina, a partir de los crímenes que ésta podría llegar a permitir en el marco de supuestas acciones de combate. El objetivo de este artículo es, entonces, indagar los límites porosos entre la legalidad y la ilegalidad en la política de defensa y en la doctrina contrainsurgente, en vistas de reponer la racionalidad militar que habilitó la implementación del terror estatal.
This article analyzes two central factors from the conditions of possibility of State terror executed by the Argentine Armed Forces during the decade of the seventies: the construction of a state of exception and the development of a doctrine of "antisubversive war". In the first place, it explores the situation of legal exceptionality created by the national State is explored through a serie of laws and decrees of defense and internal security from the sixties to 1975. Secondly, it studies the doctrine of "antisubversive war" developed by the Army, the main weapon in charge of clandestine repression, based on the crimes that it might even allow in the framework of alleged combat actions. The objective of this article is to investigate the porous limits between legality and illegality in defense policy and counterinsurgency doctrine, in order to restore the military rationality that enabled the implementation of state terror.
This article analyzes two central factors from the conditions of possibility of State terror executed by the Argentine Armed Forces during the decade of the seventies: the construction of a state of exception and the development of a doctrine of "antisubversive war". In the first place, it explores the situation of legal exceptionality created by the national State is explored through a serie of laws and decrees of defense and internal security from the sixties to 1975. Secondly, it studies the doctrine of "antisubversive war" developed by the Army, the main weapon in charge of clandestine repression, based on the crimes that it might even allow in the framework of alleged combat actions. The objective of this article is to investigate the porous limits between legality and illegality in defense policy and counterinsurgency doctrine, in order to restore the military rationality that enabled the implementation of state terror.
Palabras clave
Argentina, Terror de Estado, Estado de excepción, Contrainsurgencia, Fuerzas Armadas, State terror, State of exception