Los legados de la inestabilidad judicial en América Latina
Fecha
2017-12
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ISSN de la revista
Título del volumen
Editor
SeIDeSoC
Resumen
Descripción
Los institucionalistas han
identificado un patrón de
"reemplazo en serie", distintivo para
los países de América Latina, en los
cuales el cambio institucional se ha
vuelto frecuente y radical. Los
patrones de reemplazo en serie son
la base de las conocidas “trampas"
de la des-institucionalización: los
golpes militares generan más
golpes, los quiebres democráticos
hacen que los colapsos de la
democracia sean más probables, los
reemplazos constitucionales
fomentan la adopción de nuevas
constituciones, los conflictos entre
los distintos poderes de gobierno
fomentan mayores conflictos, etc.
En este trabajo desarrollamos una
“teoría del reemplazo en serie” y la
aplicamos para explicar los ciclos de
recambio de los jueces en las cortes
para 18 países latinoamericanos.
Usando una nueva base de datos que
incluye más de 3,000 jueces de las
Cortes Supremas y Tribunales Constitucionales entre 1900 y 2010,
mostramos que los intentos políticos
de reorganizar las Cortes Supremas
y Tribunales Constitucionales fomentan
nuevos intentos por reorganizar
dichos tribunales en años posteriores,
creando un patrón secuencial
de inestabilidad judicial perdurable
en el tiempo.
Students of institutions have identified a pattern of “serial replacement,” distinctive of Latin American countries in which institutional change has become frequent as well as radical. Patterns of serial replacement underlie wellknown “traps” of deinstitutionalization: military coups beget more coups, democratic breakdowns make breakdowns more likely, constitutional replacements encourage the adoption of new constitutions, inter-branch conflicts feed further conflicts, and so on. In this paper we develop a theory of serial replacement and apply it to explain cycles of judicial instability in 18 Latin American countries. Using a novel dataset covering more than 3,000 Supreme Court and Constitutional Tribunal justices between 1900 and 2010, we show that political attempts to reshuffle Supreme Courts and Constitutional Tribunals encourage new attempts to reshuffle the high courts in later years, creating a sequential pattern of judicial instability.
Students of institutions have identified a pattern of “serial replacement,” distinctive of Latin American countries in which institutional change has become frequent as well as radical. Patterns of serial replacement underlie wellknown “traps” of deinstitutionalization: military coups beget more coups, democratic breakdowns make breakdowns more likely, constitutional replacements encourage the adoption of new constitutions, inter-branch conflicts feed further conflicts, and so on. In this paper we develop a theory of serial replacement and apply it to explain cycles of judicial instability in 18 Latin American countries. Using a novel dataset covering more than 3,000 Supreme Court and Constitutional Tribunal justices between 1900 and 2010, we show that political attempts to reshuffle Supreme Courts and Constitutional Tribunals encourage new attempts to reshuffle the high courts in later years, creating a sequential pattern of judicial instability.
Palabras clave
Teoría del reemplazo en serie, Inestabilidad judicial, Latinoamérica, Theory of Serial replacement, Judicial instability, Latin America